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ABSTRACT
Social networking services are increasingly accessed through
mobile devices. This trend has prompted services such as
Facebook and Google+ to incorporate location as a de facto
feature of user interaction. At the same time, services based
on location such as Foursquare and Shopkick are also grow-
ing as smartphone market penetration increases. In fact,
this growth is happening despite concerns (growing at a
similar pace) about security and third-party use of private
location information (e.g., for advertising). Nevertheless,
service providers have been unwilling to build truly private
systems in which they do not have access to location infor-
mation. In this paper, we describe an architecture and a
trial implementation of a privacy-preserving location shar-
ing system called Albatross. The system protects location
information from the service provider and yet enables fine-
grained location-sharing. One main feature of the system
is to protect an individual’s social network structure. The
pattern of location sharing preferences towards contacts can
reveal this structure without any knowledge of the locations
themselves. Albatross protects locations sharing preferences
through protocol unification and masking. Albatross has
been implemented as a standalone solution, but the tech-
nology can also be integrated into location-based services to
enhance privacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones are likely to become the fastest-spreading tech-
nology in history, beating even electricity and television. Ac-
cording to a March 2012 PEW report [26], nearly half (46%)
of American adults were smartphone owners and by 2017
three billion of the estimated nine billion worldwide mo-
bile subscriptions will use a smartphone. With the spread
of smartphones, applications with location capabilities will
increase in popularity. Location-based services (LBS) typi-
cally offer benefits such as precise navigation, location-based
discount coupons, or easy information sharing through fea-
tures like social check-ins. These services are likely to reach
hundreds of millions of users over the next couple of years
with the help of smartphone market penetration.
In this paper, we concentrate on a particular LBS, social lo-
cation sharing. With services such as Foursquare [4], users
can checkin and share their current location with contacts.
Status updates which include location has now become stan-
dard on general social networks such as Facebook and Google+.
Applications such as Google Latitude [6], Highlight [7], Ap-
ple’s Find My Friends [3], and (reportedly) Facebook [2] go
a step further by sharing location with friends even while
running in the background.
According to another PEW report [29], 18% of all smart-
phone owners and 10% of all adults share location. Foursquare
claims to be used by nearly 30 million people worldwide [4].
Such growth has not come without concern; in many ways,
location sharing has been a poster child for online privacy.
For instance, the site PleaseRobMe.com was launched to list
people who were not home according to their Foursquare
checkins [4]. According to [10], over 30% of smartphone
users have turned off the location tracking feature on their
cell phone because they were concerned that other individ-
uals or companies could access that information.
The work described in this paper attempts to address the
privacy concerns of location sharing. We describe the archi-
tecture of Albatross, a location sharing application designed
for privacy. The system is named after one of the most mo-
bile of animals: “Albatrosses range over huge areas of ocean
and regularly circle the globe.” [1].
One goal of Albatross is to hide the userSˇs location from
the server and yet allow flexible sharing with other users.
Albatross can be used for sharing users’ whereabouts with
only selected contacts, such as close friends, family members
and colleagues. At the same time, another goal of Albatross
is to hide the user’s privacy policies for his location. These
policies may be even more sensitive than the location itself,
as the policies (i.e., user’s sharing preferences) can imply
who is favored by the user and who is not. We hide or
mask a user’s sharing preferences by using a meta-protocol
that hides our individual protocols. We also obscure traffic
activity through dummy sharing events.
Albatross supports an asynchronous sharing model, where
Alice can share her location or checkin to an offline contact
who can then see Alice’s location after coming online. Nat-
urally, Albatross can also be used for automated periodic
sharing or “tracking,” say sharing location with a spouse.
As Albatross never shares the location information with the
server, it is markedly different from current location sharing
services such as Foursquare and Google Latitude. All of
our protocols protect users’ location from the server, and in
addition regulate and conceal the patterns of sharing among
users.
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1.1 Contribution
Albatross is a location-sharing system composed of several
simple cryptographic protocols that allow users to share
their locations with their contacts privately. Albatross keeps
key features of a typical location-sharing service while pro-
moting privacy. The following are the two main goals:
• Location privacy. Users share their location infor-
mation only with their contacts; location data is al-
ways encrypted and never visible to the service provider.
• Social Network Privacy. By virtue of routing all
traffic, a service provider can typically observe a user’s
active social network and temporal habits. For exam-
ple, which contacts a user shares most often with and
which contacts a user shares with at different times
of day. Albatross protects against traffic analysis by
protocol hiding and adding dummy traffic.
Albatross is practical in terms of performance. All of our
protocols are lightweight, using symmetric key encryption,
and can easily be run on a mobile phone. Nevertheless, Al-
batross does introduce considerable overhead compared to a
non-private, trusted server system. Hence, we have empha-
sized efficiency in our design and made choices that reduce
computation and storage when possible. One example is
the introduction of a novel grid scheme in Section 5 that
requires only one protocol run compared to multiple runs in
other schemes, albeit at a small reduction in privacy. We
implemented Albatross as an Android application for smart
phones and measured performance overhead of the system.
(a) Checkin screenshot (b) Location reporting
Figure 1: Location sharing with Google Latitude.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is
a brief introduction to location-sharing services. Section 3
describes our privacy model and goals. Section 4 overviews
the base location-sharing and cryptographic building blocks
used to construct Albatross. Section 5 describes our grid
and cell system. Section 6 details the main Albatross proto-
col, one that incorporates the basic protocols of Section 4.
Section 7 describes our prototype implementation.
2. LOCATION SHARING SERVICES
We provide some background on location sharing services.
2.1 Example of Google Latitude
In general, users run a mobile application that connects to
the location sharing service website. Through the applica-
tion, the user can checkin or announce his location to some
set of his contacts. Two users can become contacts by mu-
tual agreement; for instance, one user can invite another user
to be a contact, which can then be accepted. We briefly
outline the functionality of Google Latitude [6], which is
fairly typical of location sharing services. Figure 1a shows a
screenshot of checkin. Note that in Google Latitude a user
can checkin to a fake location (see Figure 1b).
(a) Sharing preference for
a particular friend
(b) Retrieval of friend lo-
cations
Figure 2: Friends in Google Latitude
For each contact, a user may set a different preference or
granularity of location sharing. See Figure 2a for the ex-
ample of Google Latitude. A user can share his exact lo-
cation, an approximate location, or not share location at
all. Finally, using an interface such as Figure 2b, a user can
retrieve or see the locations of his friends.
Note that the locations of users are visible to Google Lat-
itude. Furthermore, the sharing activity and granularities
for each user are also available. Hence, Google Latitude can
reconstruct not only users’ movements over time but the
whole social network.
2.2 Location Sharing Granularities
Location sharing preferences can be quite diverse; for in-
stance, users may want to share their exact location, an ap-
proximate location (e.g., city-level as in Figure 2a in Google
Latitude), choose to be invisible (“Hide our location” in Fig-
ure 1b), or provide a fake location (“Set your location” in
Figure 1b). Each choice is called the granularity of the
location-sharing. The granularity of sharing may vary with
the particular contact. For instance, a user may want to
share their exact location with family, an approximate lo-
cation with close friends, and be invisible to everyone else.
These preferences may also change from moment to moment.
Albatross offers a set of granularities {available, approxi-
mate, nearby, invisible, fake} composed of the most common
preferences. We summarize the meaning of these granulari-
ties as follows:
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• Available: share exact location
• Approximate: share approximate location, e.g., the
city or region
• Nearby: share approximate location only if the contact
is nearby
• Invisible: share nothing, also known as hiding
• Fake: share a fake location. This might be an exact or
approximate location.
3. LOCATION-SHARING PRIVACY DEFI-
NITION
A location-sharing service manages events of the following
form: User A shares timestamped location information (of
some granularity) with User B. We assume the service relays
traffic between User A and User B and hence knows the time
of the sharing event. Historical data for the service consists
of a record of all events with timestamps.
Sharing events may be encrypted so that the service cannot
necessarily determine the location or granularity of the shar-
ing event but does know the parties involved in the sharing
event. We also assume the possibility of “dummy” sharing
events that do not convey any information from User A to
User B. The service cannot distinguish between an actual
sharing event and a “dummy” event. Hence, despite the
service observing all the traffic, the service does not know
whether a user has actually shared location information with
another user.
Assuming the service has all historical data to analyze, ideal
privacy for users of a location-sharing service consists of the
following:
• At any time, the service knows nothing about any
user’s location.
• At any time, the service or any other users know noth-
ing about whether any user is online. This implies a
lack of gaps in the event stream for any user. Such
a gap may imply undesirable inferences, such as an
airplane flight.
• At any time, only users which User A has shared with
know about A’s location. These users know User A’s
location only to the degree of granularity specified.
• The service learns nothing about a user’s contacts. In
particular, the service learns nothing about a user’s
social circles, e.g., who he commonly shares with and
to what degree.
In practice, ideal privacy is difficult to achieve since in our
architecture all traffic goes through the server. A user’s
active contacts would eventually be revealed through traffic
analysis, unless a large amount of dummy traffic is sent. In
our design we chose to reveal each user’s contacts to the
server. This seems an acceptable tradeoff for scalability, as
securing location is the primary goal and the inner structure
of each user’s contacts (e.g., close vs. not-so-close friends)
remains protected.
Likewise, we chose not to protect temporal patterns from the
server. This is, however, an interesting direction for future
research. A system where every device appears active to
the server is possible; one scheme would involve an auxiliary
proxy (for instance, in the cloud or a desktop at home) that
funnels traffic and covers up for the device if it is offline.
3.1 Adversarial Model
Before we discuss the privacy goals of Albatross, we outline
the adversarial model. We assume an untrusted server, but
a server that is Honest-but-Curious. This assumption is re-
alistic, as argued in [13]: violating the honest-but-curious
model risks damage to a service provider’s reputation. The
server correctly routes protocol messages, but does not at-
tempt to create fake users or collaborate with existing users.
In particular, for our VPET protocol (see Section 4.2), server
collusion with User B would reveal User A’s location.
We see data sub-poenas, hacker break-ins, or inadvertent
data release as examples of threats on server-side data. These
are the main motivation for the Albatross system. Threats
from users trying to infer the location of another user also
must be considered, although for the most part these threats
are similar to threats in existing systems. In the Alba-
tross system, the attacker would have to be a contact of
another user to get any information at all. However, for the
“nearby” location granularity (in which a user reveals loca-
tion to nearby contacts only), there are new privilege escala-
tion attacks, where an attacker granted the nearby location
privilege tries virtually placing himself in many locations in
order to narrow down the possible location space of the user.
3.2 Privacy Goals of Albatross
Our privacy goals improve upon existing systems in that
the server remains oblivious to users’ (1) locations, and (2)
sharing granularities or circles. Specifically, our goals are:
• P1 (Server): The server learns nothing other than
the set of contacts for each user and which users are
online in any given time interval. The server does not
learn anything about a user’s social network structure
(other than the set of contacts). The server does not
learn the granularity of shared location.
• P2 (User): A user’s contacts learn only the location
granularity that he intends for them to know. This
goal is no different from current location sharing ser-
vices such as Google Latitude. Furthermore, his con-
tacts cannot infer when a user is offline. The reason
is that when User A is invisible to User B, User A
wants there to be uncertainty as to whether A is being
purposefully invisible or simply offline.
Note that network and device information may reveal infor-
mation about a user; for instance, the IP address may reveal
an approximate location using a geo-location database. Sim-
ilarly, a mobile carrier will have location information on a
device from the cell towers it connects to. These concerns
may be mitigated through use of an anonymizing network
and a proxy device, but we do not directly address these
concerns in this paper and assume the server’s information
consists solely of our protocol information.
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4. BASE PROTOCOLS
We start with the case where User B shares his exact lo-
cation with User A at a certain time; in other words, User
B is checking in to User A with the preference of “avail-
able.” User A then retrieves User B’s location information,
perhaps at some later point in time. We hide this sharing
from other contacts and the server with the following sim-
ple asynchronous protocol. The same protocol is used if B
shares an approximate or a fake location.
We assume the existence of a shared key kAB between users
who are contacts A and B. This shared key can be created
at the time a user adds another user as a contact. If a pub-
lic/private key pairs is in place on the device, say through
an existing PKI set up by the social network, this shared
key can be formed using the Diffie-Hellman key-exchange
protocol. SocialKeys has been proposed as a lighter weight
alternative [21].
4.1 Private Sharing Protocol (PSP)
With PSP, the location information – either approximate,
exact, or fake – is simply encrypted so that it remains hid-
den from unauthorized users and the server. Let A-Alice
and B-Bob and S-Server be the three parties involved in the
protocol. Table 1 gives the basic parameters used in PSP.
Table 1: Basic protocol parameters
xA and xB Location information for A and B respectively
E Symmetric encryption function
kAB is the key shared by users A and B
a counter value set to zero in the very first
ctr handshake between A and B and incremented
whenever new masking keys are needed.
k1, k2. . . parts of the encrypted ctr value
Figure 3 shows how the location information, xB is en-
crypted by user B so that it remains hidden from the server.
The encryption is performed by masking the location with
the output of the pseudorandom function (PRF) E. Since
the bit size of the mask is determined by the location pre-
cision, a single encryption can be used for multiple sharing
instances. For instance, if the location information xB is
presented by 32-bits and E is 128-bit block cipher such as
AES, both parties would perform a single encryption of ctr
and reuse the four different blocks of the ciphertext ki. This
is equivalent to a single encryption after every four shar-
ing instances. Note that the Server is passive, i.e., it only
transmits the messages in this protocol.
A
(k, xA ) Server
B
(k, xB )
(mb ,ctr)(mb ,ctr)
mb = xB+k1
k1 = Ek (ctr)k1 = Ek (ctr)
xB = mb + k1
Figure 3: Private sharing protocol
In some cases, users might want to share their location infor-
mation with only their nearby contacts (e.g., within a circle
of radius r) who have made their location visible (available,
approximate, or nearby). Compared to unconditional shar-
ing in PSP, this sharing has the requirement that users need
to know their contact’s location or proximity before sharing
their own location. For instance, if user A receives location
information xB from user B, he may determine that user B
is nearby and decide to share his location information xA.
In fact, this is a natural interaction in a location sharing ser-
vice. Hence, PSP can still be used after checking a contact’s
location or proximity.
However, proximity sharing is a bit more complicated if two
users want to share their locations to each other only if the
other is nearby. In this case, since both parties do not have
any prior location or proximity information PSP is not use-
ful. There are more sophisticated solutions available:
4.2 Vectorial Private Equality Testing (VPET)
Protocol
We describe in Section 5.2 the relationship between private
proximity sharing and the so-called Private Equality Test-
ing problem (PET). Basically, one can subdivide the earth’s
surface into a grid and test equality of belonging to the same
grid. PET is also known as ”Socialist Millionaire Problem”
[16] where two millionaires want to determine whether their
wealth is equivalent or not, without disclosing any informa-
tion about their riches to each other.
PET is a well-studied problem in the literature. Various
aspects and use cases of PET were considered in a num-
ber of studies including [14, 8, 28, 21]. The majority of
these solutions are two-party protocols using computation-
ally intensive cryptographic primitives such as homomor-
phic, commutative, or public-key encryption. Nevertheless,
there are three-party protocols such as [21, 24] that use com-
parably lightweight symmetric-key primitives requiring far
less communication. In Albatross we use VPET [24], one
of these recently proposed protocols for sharing locations to
only nearby users. Naturally, using a different PET protocol
would not effect the overall system. For completeness, we
briefly describe the VPET protocol here.
(ctr, b) b = r·R(xB,θ) + s;
- Compute a = R(u, θ); (ctr,a)
m = <a, b> 
(m)
Test <a, s> = m
Set (s,θ) = Ek(ctr);- Set (s,θ) = Ek(ctr);
?
A
(k, xA )
Server B(k, xB )
- Generate vector u such
that <xA, u> = 0;
Figure 4: VPET protocol
The flow of the protocols presented in Fig. 4. Assume that
Bob wants to share his private location xB with Alice. In
VPET, location values are mapped to vectors using a vector-
ization process and these vectors are masked by the following
values
(s, θ) = EkAB (ctr)
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Bob arranges the output of the PRF, E, in a way that s
represents a vector having random entries and θ represents
a rotation angle. Next, Bob computes:
b = rR(xB, θ) + s
where r is a non-zero random number and s is taken from
the E function. He sends b and ctr to the server.
Alice, in order to compute whether Bob is nearby, first
queries the server to obtain the latest value of ctr from Bob.
Alice aborts if the ctr received from the server is not fresh,
otherwise Alice computes (s, θ) = Ek(ctr) and a unit vec-
tor u perpendicular to xA. Alice then blinds u by using
the rotation function R, where θ is pseudorandom value by
definition. Alice sends a = R(u, θ) and ctr to the Server.
The Server matches the messages having the same ctr value
from Alice and Bob, and performs a single inner product
operation giving m = 〈a, b〉, then sends m to Alice.
m = 〈a, b〉 = 〈R(u, θ), rR(xB, θ) + s〉
= r〈R(u, θ), R(xB, θ)〉+ 〈R(u, θ), s〉 (1)
Since R is an angle preserving map, R(xB, θ) is perpendic-
ular to the vector R(u, θ) if the private values (vectors) of
Bob and Alice are same (i.e., xA = xB). Notice that in this
case the inner product on the left of Eqn. (1) vanishes and
only 〈R(u, θ), s)〉 remains. Alice can compute this value as
it does not contain the blinding r. Therefore, Alice com-
putes 〈R(u, θ), s)〉, and if she finds that m = 〈R(u, θ), s)〉,
she learns that she has the same private vector as Bob.
4.3 Approximate and Fake Location Sharing
At the protocol level, approximate and fake locations are
shared in the same manner as actual locations, simply en-
crypted and routed through the Server using the PSP Pro-
tocol. The Albatross system does not guide or make sug-
gestions to the user on what to use as an approximate or
fake location. We note, however, that this is an interesting
area for future work. Realistic faking especially is ripe with
challenges, as the fake locations should be realistic to adver-
saries with potentially a great deal of auxiliary information.
Previous work in faking of locations include [17, 12, 25].
4.4 Protocol Chart
The chart in Table 2 gives the use of the protocols PSP and
VPET with respect to the user’s sharing preferences.
Table 2: Albatross’ protocol chart.
A⇒ B available circle approx nearby invisible fake
available PSP PSP PSP PSP PSP PSP
circle PSP PSP PSP PSP PSP PSP
approx PSP PSP PSP PSP PSP PSP
nearby PSP PSP PSP VPET n/a PSP
invisible n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
fake PSP PSP PSP PSP PSP PSP
A ⇒ B shows how User A shares her location with User B.
For instance, the first row is read as available User A shares
her location (only) with B using protocol PSP, no matter
what User B’s status is.
5. GPS DATA AND GRID SYSTEMS
In this section we give background on GPS coordinates and
grid systems for Albatross. We describe a novel grid scheme
that provides additional efficiency compared to existing schemes,
but at a small reduction in privacy.
5.1 GPS Coordinates
When using PSP, one directly shares the location data as
captured from the device, say, by the GPS system. In typ-
ical applications, acceptable precision can be achieved by
packing GPS coordinates (a latitude-longitude pair) into 8
bytes. Hence, in Albatross we allocate 8 bytes for each ex-
act location and truncate input from the GPS system. Ta-
ble 3 gives the relationship between a given precision and its
equivalent physical distance on the earth’s surface.
Table 3: Precision used in GPS data.
fractional digits
2 3 4 5
total bits needed 31 37 43 51
distance on latitude 1,117 m 111 m 11 m 1.1 m
distance polar circles 444 m 44 m 4.4 m 0.4 m
on tropic circles 1,021 m 102 m 10 m 1 m
longitude equator 1,113 m 111 m 11 m 1.1 m
5.2 Private Equality Testing and Grids
In principle, the neighbourhood of a location is defined by a
circle and the proximity testing problem is to test whether
a contact is inside or outside of the circle. In other words,
checking whether a user is nearby or not consists of obtain-
ing the location of the user (e.g., via GPS), calculating the
distance to this location, and testing if the distance is lower
than some radius r. As pointed out in [21], this ideal def-
inition suffers from a triangulation attack that reveals the
exact location by stepping across the circular boundary at
two different points. Moreover, if the location values are
encrypted, the distance calculation would need a costly ho-
momorphic encryption scheme.
Figure 5: Direct distance computation versus approximation
methods. The green user is in both the circle and grid cell
and is correctly considered as nearby. However, both of the
red users are falsely detected. One of the red users is not in
the cell and is thus considered as far away (although he is
in the range of the circle). Similarly, the other red user is
considered as nearby because he is in the grey cell but he is
not in the range of the circle.
Hence, as in [21], we reduce private proximity testing to
private equality testing (PET), using a grid or tessellation
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of the surface of the earth. Each grid cell has a unique
identifier, and the users can compare the identifiers of the
grid cells using a PET protocol. Grid cells do not necessarily
match with circular neighbourhoods, so the proximity test
is less accurate. For example, in Figure 5 a user (drawn in
black) wants to share his location in the range of a circle
while the gray area covers his residing cell.
One way to improve the accuracy is to use more and/or
smaller cells to approximate the area of the circle as in Fig-
ure 6. This approach increases the number of cells to com-
pare, as a user must run a PET protocol to compare grid cell
identifiers for each of the cells making up the approximate
disk.
(a) (b) (c)
a grid
cell
cell
cell
Figure 6: Grids approximating the disk. Observe that (a)
needs 9, (b) needs 29, and (c) needs 3 cell comparisons.
Moreover (b) is the most and (c) is the least accurate.
The approximation can be done in different ways, using
square cells, hexagonal cells, as well as other shapes, or
overlapping layers of cells [21, 22, 28, 20]. While all ap-
proximation based solutions are inaccurate, certain shapes
can approximate a circle using fewer cells than others.
5.3 Albatross Grids and Cells
The Albatross system does not depend on any particular
grid scheme. Nevertheless, we have chosen to construct our
own grid scheme which is highly efficient (with only one
PET protocol run) but with a potential reduction in privacy
compared to other schemes. To describe our scheme, we
deviate from standard terminology slightly. In the literature,
a grid cell means an element of the grid tessellation. In this
paper, we say the grid is the tessellation of the surface of
the earth into approximate disks. Each element of the grid
is further subdivided into cells. A grid element is the union
of cells approximating the circle.
(a) (b) (c)
a grid
Figure 7: Grids with hexagonal cells.
In order to approximate the area of the circle with cells, each
location can be tagged with a grid ID and a cell ID. Assume
that the grid consists of a collection of cells that cover the
location space without overlap. In other words, grids have a
regular shape such that there is no location left uncovered.
For instance, grids such as (a) and (c) in Figure 6 can cover
the location space without overlap but not (b) because of its
non-regular boundary.
Accuracy of a circle covering approximation can be increased
by increasing the number of cells in a grid. This can be done
effectively using hexagonal cells as seen in Figure 7. Observe
that (a) has 7, (b) has 19, and (c) has 37 cells in their grids.
As the number of cells increases, accuracy increases. Note
also that all these grids span the location space evenly when
tiled correctly.
5.4 Canonical Grid Identifiers
We describe here how the whole globe might be mapped by
a grid system. The grid granularity must first be fixed. This
corresponds to a notion of how to quantify when two users
are considered “nearby”.
Grid Element labels: Starting from the north pole and
the 0th longitude passing from Greenwich, one can enumer-
ate the grids having, say, 1 degree width and length until
reaching the south pole as seen in Figure 9. Note that in this
grid system, the grid elements are not perfect squares but
for simplicity we treat them as squares. The grid elements
then can be uniquely labeled with a simple enumeration.
1 2
North 
Pole
N 89° 
E 1° 
latitudes
longtitutes
0° E 2° W 179° 
N 88° 
3
6
1
3
6
0
7
2
0
3
6
2
.
.
...
.
.
.
.
...
Figure 9: A simple labeling of grid elements.
Cell labels: Each cell in a grid element is labeled with an
identifier that is unique within the grid element. Moreover,
this labeling is done so that across the whole location space
each cellSˇs identifier is unique in an approximate disk cen-
tered at that cell. For instance, in Figure 8 we give two
examples of cell labels for a portion of the whole plane.
5.5 Grid Proximity Protocol
We present the protocol used in proximity testing for Al-
batross. Our method needs only a single comparison (i.e.,
VPET protocol run), independent of the number of approx-
imation cells. The protocol starts as with a grid and cell
system labeled as in the previous section. One party pro-
vides a cell label to the other party, and both parties are
able to select grid elements for equality testing. The two
parties are nearby if and only if the grid elements are equal.
6
9 7 8 9 7
3 1 2 3 1
9 7 8 9 7
3 1 2 3 1
6 4 5 6 4
6 4 5 6 4
8
2
8
2
5
5
8
2
8
2
5
5
6 4 5 6 45 5
(a)
27 6
5
6
7
5
4
7
1
4
3
1
2
3
4 5
3
3
1
4
6
6
7
2
2 1675
3 41
6
1
2
6
7
2
4
7
5
4
3
5
26
5
5
4
7
1
2
3
32 17 6
1
(b)
Figure 8: Cells are labeled so that any approximate disk is a “Latin Square”. For a grid of square elements composed of 9 cells
each, any approximate disk has 9 cells with exactly one cell labeled from 1 to 9. For grid elements composed of 7 hexagons,
any approximate disk having 7 cells has exactly one cell labeled from 1 to 7.
cB
Locate the nearest cell
with label cB
A
(lA )
B
(lB )
Determine cell cB and
grid gB for lB
Set the grid element
gA that contains cell cB
Run a PET to test the equality of gA and gB
Figure 10: Grid Proximity Protocol.
Figure 10 shows the steps of the protocol. Let lA and lB
represent the exact locations of User A and User B, respec-
tively. First, User B computes the cell cB and grid element
gB corresponding to his location. User A locates the nearest
cell with label cB . User A selects the grid element contain-
ing this cell, call is gA. User B uses the grid element gB in
the VPET protocol run with User A. User A compares gB
to see if it is equal to gA.
In order to describe the process more clearly, we work through
the protocol in a toy example. We first consider the case
where two users are nearby (Figure 11a). Suppose User A
wants to learn whether B is nearby or not. User B computes
his grid element to be ”2” and cell label as ”7”. Nearby thus
corresponds to be inside the circle in Figure 11a, approxi-
mated by the red-colored square. User B sends the cell label
7 to User A. After User A receives User B’s cell label, User A
takes the cell nearest to his location with the same label. By
virtue of the Latin Square property, there is only one such
cell. User A knows that if User A and User B are nearby,
User B should be in this cell. Therefore, User A looks up
the grid element containing this cell and determines that it
is ”2”. B then sends this grid element to A in the VPET
protocol. After a run of VPET, User A concludes that User
B is nearby, although they reside in different grids in the
grid system.
Let us change the location of User B slightly and repeat the
same experiment. Assume that User A is in the same loca-
tion but User B is located at cell 7 in grid 361 (Figure 11b).
After User A gets User B’s cell label, User A assumes that
User B should be in the closest cell labeled with 7 (i.e., the
red cell in Figure 11b) and sends the respective grid element
”2” to A in the VPET protocol comparison. Since User B’s
grid element is ”361”, she concludes that they are not nearby.
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Figure 11: Grid Protocol Example.
Note that the grid system in use can be fixed or can be
negotiated. To the extreme, any GPS location can be viewed
as a cell and according to the proximity needed a hexagon
approximating a circle can be used for the equality testing.
Note that our system trades efficiency for a reduction in
privacy for User B. User A gains knowledge of User B’s cell
label. If User B has little idea of User A’s whereabouts,
the leakage of the cell label does little harm since there are
many cells with the same label. However, if User B has
auxiliary knowledge about User A’s location, then knowing
the cell label can further narrow down User A’s location.
In this way, our system shares a weakness of existing work:
the proximity protocols leak more than strictly desired. If
User B is actually “nearby”, User A can localize User B to a
smaller area than an approximate disk around User A. In (a)
of Figure 5, the 9 comparisons would reveal which individual
cell User B is in. This is an interesting area for future work
(see the Appendix in [21] for an approach to this problem).
6. UNIFIED LOCATION PROTOCOL
As described in Section 3.2, the active social network of a
user is considered private information. From the sharing
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habits of a user, one can determine the user’s circles and
close relationships. One of goals of Albatross is to hide this
information from the server and other users. To accomplish
this goal, we use protocol hiding by unifying base protocols.
To explain the problem in more detail, consider Table 4
where we give an example of the sort of information that
can be inferred by the server. One problem is that the PSP
and VPET protocols differ in structure. Hence, by virtue of
routing the traffic, the server can determine whether User
A’s location sharing granularity for User B is ”nearby” or
not. This violates Property P1 of our privacy goals.
Table 4: Server view without unified protocol. The server
can see whether a user’s preference for other users is nearby
or not. The server can also see contacts a user is not sharing
with and which users are offline.
User A User B User C User D User E . . .
User A n/a PSP invis. VPET PSP . . .
User B PSP n/a invis. VPET PSP . . .
User C VPET PSP n/a VPET PSP . . .
User D PSP PSP PSP n/a PSP . . .
User E offl. offl. offl. offl. n/a . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
To address this problem, we describe a Unified Location
Protocol which masks to the server which protocol (PSP or
VPET) is being used. This protocol is asynchronous, like
its underlying base protocols. This protocol is used with all
contacts. If the preference is to share nothing (i.e., remain
invisible), an agreed upon dummy location can be shared.
However, another problem then appears: User A may choose
to be invisible to User B, which means User A does not
share location with User B. This preference is supposed to be
hidden from the server, so A must still checkin to B, or else
the server would know the preference. However, User B can
then tell whether User A is offline or just being invisible with
respect to User B (see Table 5) as presumably User A must
be online in order to checkin. This problem is more apparent
with periodic location checkins or “tracking” as opposed to
sporadic checkins. This violates Property P2 of our privacy
goals.
Table 5: User A’s view without caching. Besides the sharing
preferences of his contacts, User A can also see whether each
contact is offline, if they checkin periodically.
User B User C User D User E . . .
status nearby invisible available offline . . .
Property P2 says that if a user goes offline, his contacts
should not be aware of this fact. We address this problem
with a caching scheme used in conjunction with the Unified
Location Protocol. The user employs the caching scheme
with the help of the server. The server will be aware that a
user is offline, and can help the user maintain the illusion of
still being active to his contacts.
6.1 Protocol Masking
By masking the protocol traffic, we hide the user’s active
social network from the server. For instance, the server can-
not tell that User A is hiding from User B, as opposed to
some other location sharing preference, such as “Available”.
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Figure 12: Unified Protocol encapsulating both PSP and
VPET protocols
We overload specific location coordinates to carry special
meaning: xn (= not nearby), xy(= nearby), and xi (= in-
visible). These are dummy location coordinates and used to
hide communication from the server through the PSP proto-
col. These coordinates, for instance, have longitudes larger
than 180. The xi coordinate is used with PSP when a user
wants to be invisible with respect to another user.
Figure 12 shows the structure of the PSP and VPET pro-
tocols; the structure of the Unified Protocol simply encap-
sulates both base protocols. There are two protocol actions
associated with the Unified Protocol: Checkin and Retrieval.
Checkin is performed by User B to share location with User
A. Retrieval is performed by User A to see User B’s location.
Retrieval can be performed anytime after checkin, even af-
ter User B is offline, due to the asynchronous nature of the
protocol.
As described in Section 4, we assume A and B share a key
kAB and they can create keys k1 and k2 by encrypting the
ctr value with kAB . In the same way, a user can create a
random bit to encrypt one bit of information.
Checkin: User B shares with User A
Before checkin, User B may have done a retrieval of A’s loca-
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tion information at some point in the past. This information
is used in the case that A’s preference is PSP and B’s pref-
erence is VPET. If B has no information on A’s location, B
assumes A is “invisible.”
Step 1: User B generates a random number for the ctr
value. He encrypts ctr with kAB . He places the ctr value
on the server and two encrypted bits. One bit is the pro-
tocol bit for his sharing granularity towards A, representing
whether B wants to use the VPET or PSP protocol with A,
i.e., whether B’s location sharing preference for User A is
“nearby” or not. This is bB→A. The other bit is A’s sharing
granularity towards B, stored from the last retrieval of A:
bA→B . If his sharing preference is “nearby” he also places
his cell number.
Table 6: Step 1 of Unified Protocol. User B stores these
values on server.
Field Description
counter mandatory
Protocol bit for B → A: bB→A mandatory
Protocol bit for A→ B: bA→B random bit if bB→A is PSP
cell number random if bB→A is PSP
B’s vector mandatory
There are three cases:
A is VPET/B is VPET: B proceeds as in the VPET pro-
tocol and sends to the server v2 = rR(xB, θ) + s.
A is PSP/B is VPET: From B’s last retrieval of A’s lo-
cation, B computes and sends to the server the encrypted
location vector (xy
⊕
k1, k2) or v2 = (xn
⊕
k1, k2) depend-
ing on whether A is nearby or not.
Otherwise: B sends to the server the vector (xB
⊕
k1, k2).
B may send xi for xB if he wants to be invisible to A.
Retrieval: User A gets User B’s location information
Step 2: A retrieves ctr and bB→A and bA→B. If bB→A is
VPET and bA→B is out-of-date, A aborts. Otherwise, there
are two cases:
A is VPET/B is VPET: A proceeds as in the VPET pro-
tocol and sends the vector v1 = R(u, θ) to the server.
Otherwise: A sends a random vector (b1, b2), one that cor-
responds to a location through the vectorization process.
We cannot use a completely random vector as this would be
distinguishable from the vector in the other case.
Step 3: The server computes the vector inner product m =
〈v1, v2〉 and sends the result to A.
Step 4: A decrypts inner product. There are two cases:
A is VPET/B is VPET: As in the VPET protocol, A
computes 〈R(u, θ), s)〉 and if this quantity is equal to m,
then B is nearby.
Otherwise: A receivesm = b1(xB
⊕
k1)+b2k2. A knows
all values except xB and so can compute xB .
Notes:
(1) In all cases Server does the same operation in Step 3, an
inner product, and cannot infer anything from v1 and v2.
(2) The unified protocol as described only shows B sharing
with A. In reality, there is also A sharing with B. Both
directions have their own counters, keys, and preferences.
6.2 Counter Caching
Since the server is assumed to be honest-but-curious, there
is no need to defend against it performing message-replay
attacks. By allowing the server to replay messages, we en-
able it to reissue advertisements of invisibility on behalf of
clients who are actually offline. In other words we allow the
server to help the user maintain the illusion of being online
to other users. The idea is that Step 1 can be done multi-
ple times by User B in batch, each time generating a new
counter and specifying the PSP protocol for B’s granularity
towards A. User B can also do Step 3 in batch, specifying
xi (=invisible) for xB and sending v = (xB
⊕
k1, k2). The
server keeps a conceptual table for each user, as in Table 7.
At the end of the protocol, User A sees that User B is invis-
ible and cannot tell if User B is actually online or not. After
a counter value has been used, the corresponding row in the
table can be deleted.
Table 7: User’s counter cache. This information is used by
the server to help the user checkin even when offline and
thus maintain the illusion of being online. The checkins
the server makes on behalf of the user corresponds to the
“invisible” preference; hence all contacts will see this user as
“invisible.”
Counter Protocol bit Encrypted location
ctr1 E(PSP) v1
ctr2 E(PSP) v2
ctr3 E(PSP) v3
...
...
...
If the user is actually online and wishes to change his shar-
ing granularity, he can generate a new counter value and
prepend a new row to his counter cache table.
6.3 Privacy Analysis with Unified Protocol
In Tables 8 and 9 we see the end result of our unified pro-
tocol. The server sees only whether the user is on or off.
The user sees only the sharing granularity of his contacts
towards himself, not whether they are online or offline.
Table 8: Server view with unified protocol. The server sees
only whether a user is online or not, as well as the set of
contacts for each user. Nothing about the preferences for
each contact can be seen by the server.
User B User C User D User E . . .
status on on on off . . .
7. SYSTEM PROTOTYPE
Albatross is realized as a working research prototype and
we describe the implementation here. With this prototype,
we demontrate that the performance of Albatross is suitable
for real-world deployment and raises no scalability concerns.
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Table 9: User A’s view with unified protocol and caching.
User A can see the preferences of his contacts towards User
A, but cannot tell if users are invisible or simply offline. In
this way, his contacts maintain plausible deniability about
being offline versus purposefully hiding from User A.
User B User C User D User E . . .
status nearby invisible available invisible . . .
The overhead compared to a non-private system is on the
order of the average number of contacts.
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Figure 13: High-level Albatross architecture. The server
is built on top of Apache/PHP/MySQL. The client is an
Android application with persistent storage in SQLite.
7.1 Server-side
We used Apache/PHP and MySQL as the backbone of our
server-side implementation (see Fig. 13). The main MySQL
tables are a users table that contains profile data and a con-
tacts table that contains a list of contacts (i.e., edges in the
social graph) in the system. Each edge in the contacts table
contains protocol information for both protocol directions,
for example, User A’s sharing with User B and also User
B’s sharing with User A. Registration and authentication is
through a username and password.
7.2 Client-side
We developed an Android client for Albatross. This client
application keeps sharing preferences and keys for each con-
tact in the native Android SQLite database. SQLite gives
us a self-contained SQL database to store contact data even
after Albatross is stopped.
The client consists of a protocol handler that determines
the protocol to use and performs the Unified Protocol steps.
The protocol handler uses the Spongy Castle cryptographic
library, a repackaging of the standard Bouncy Castle cryp-
tographic libraries explicitly for the Android platform. Al-
batross employs Spongy Castle for AES and Diffie-Hellman
key exchange calculations.
Note that we relied on a public/private key pair on the An-
droid devices in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. These key
pairs were generated as part of Albatross installation. The
client also contains a location handler which gets location in-
formation from the device via the GPS system. Correspond-
ing to the GPS location, the protocol handler determines the
grid and cell values if using the VPET protocol.
7.3 Performance
We measured the total time for a retrieval on a Samsung
Galaxy S III smartphone having a 1.5 GHz dual-core Qual-
comm Krait processor running Android 4.0.4. The time for
a checkin should be even less. Our server was an Ubuntu
12.04 LTS instance in the Amazon Elastic Cloud (EC2), run-
ning on an AMD 64 with 1.7 GB of memory. As our server
was dedicated to only Albatross, we picked a small instance
(m1.small) providing a single EC2 compute unit.
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Figure 14: Retrieval time for various numbers of contacts.
Recall that in the Unified Protocol, users share some loca-
tion – real, approximate, fake or dummy – with all of their
contacts. The Unified Protocol has two halves, a checkin and
a retrieval. For experimental purposes, we placed checkin
data on the server and executed the Unified Protocol for
retrieval (the more complex and time-sensitive half of the
protocol) in batch. Location information for all contacts
was downloaded, corresponding to a user finding where all
his friends are. We assumed that users have around 500 con-
tacts total. Averaging over 20 retrievals, we found that it
took about 1.1 seconds for a user to retrieve location infor-
mation for all 500 contacts. In order to see the effect of the
number of users, we repeated our experiments for various
numbers of contacts as illustrated in Figure 14 and the time
scales about linearly with the number of contacts.
One question is how our privacy requirements effect the total
amount of storage and user/server workloads. Compared to
a simple location uploading for a trusted server, as in Google
Latitude and Foursquare, Albatross requires protocol inter-
action with each contact (through the server) rather than an
interaction with just the server. Also, the Unified Protocol is
more complex than a simple upload. In Tables 10 and 11 we
give a theoretical description of the performance and storage
costs of the Unified Protocol in terms of N , the number of
a user’s contacts. For a trusted server, each checkin is sim-
ply the uploading of location information to the server. For
Albatross, each checkin involves one symmetric encryption
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and random number generation on the client side for each of
the user’s contacts. Each retrieval requires two client-server
interactions. Since the number of contacts in a social net-
work generally runs in the several hundreds [15], as a rough
estimate the performance and storage costs for Albatross
can be on the order of N times more than for a non-private
system.
Table 10: Summary of Albatross computation costs for one
user’s checkin and retrieval. In Albatross, checkins must be
performed per contact. The checkin is also more involved,
with a symmetric encryption and random number genera-
tion per contact. The retrieval using Albatross involves two
client-server interactions, the server computes a different in-
ner product for each contact, and each inner product must
be decrypted. Hence, the computation costs for Albatross
scale with the number of contacts N . Below, C represents
a constant cost independent of N .
Client cost Server Client cost
Protocol (Retrieval) cost (Checkin)
Unified O(N) O(N) O(N)
Non-private C C C
Table 11: Albatross storage requirements per user. In Alba-
tross, clients store a key (16 bytes) and location preference
(1 byte) for each contact. Servers store state information
for the Unified Protocol (17 bytes, see Table 6) and also,
say, 10 cache values of state information. In a non-private,
trusted server protocol, servers store the user’s location and
location preferences per contact.
Client Server
Protocol storage storage
Unified Protocol (16 + 1)N 17 ∗ 11 ∗N bytes
Non-private Protocol 0 8 +N bytes
8. RELATED WORK
Existing production location sharing systems with a trusted
server include Foursquare [4], Google Latitude [6], Apple’s
Find My Friends [3], and Glympse [5]. There has been work
on location sharing systems that enhance privacy through an
untrusted server. The work by Narayanan et al. [21] concen-
trates on a particular type of location sharing, the “nearby”
sharing granularity. We aim for a more complete system
that includes different granularities of location sharing and
address the issue of how to hide these granularities from the
server. Zhong et al. [28], Mascetti et al. [19, 20], and Nielsen
et al. [22] also focus on the “nearby” sharing granularity.
Private versions of other types of social networking systems
with an untrusted server have also been studied. Cristofaro
et al. [13] studied micro-blogs, specifically Twitter. Their
system is analogous to ours in that they attempt to pro-
vide the expected core micro-blogging services, and yet hide
tweets, hashtags, and followers from the server. Rieffel et
al. [23] study presence systems, in which a user’s presence
status (“in building”, “in office”, “has visitor”, etc.) is hid-
den from the server. There is a large body of work studying
recommender systems with untrusted servers; early work in
this area was performed by Canny [11].
Location privacy in general is a well-studied topic. Problems
such as anonymity and obfuscation of location data is one
area of concentration. Krumm [18] provides a good survey
for this area. Another area of study is user preferences for
location sharing, for instance, see [27, 9].
9. CONCLUSION
We present Albatross, a new privacy-enhanced location shar-
ing service. We designed a complete system with a full se-
lection of location sharing granularities. Such a complete
system may reveal social networks, i.e., individual social cir-
cles, through analysis of individual sharing granularities over
time. Previous work has in general concentrated on a par-
ticular sharing granularity, such as “nearby”.
In our design of Albatross we analyse desired privacy prop-
erties of a location sharing service and achieved location pri-
vacy from the service provider and social network privacy.
The level of privacy attained is not complete, but seems rea-
sonable given the practical considerations of keeping traffic
at a reasonable level. We achieved location privacy through
lightweight cryptographic protocols and social network pri-
vacy through protocol unification and masking. A working
research prototype of Albatross showed performance is ac-
ceptable.
There are numerous opportunities to improve and extend
Albatross. For example, privacy may be further improved
by protecting a user’s offline/online patterns from the server
through a proxy architecture. Also, we plan to investigate
how a system such as Albatross can support services such as
advertising and location recommendation. After all, the ap-
peal of holding consumer location information is the poten-
tial increase in precision and relevance of recommendations
and targeted ads. We believe advertising and location rec-
ommendation systems are still possible with Albatross but
of course will have to be re-designed.
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